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a b s t r a c t
Two experiments attempted to reconcile discrepant recent findings
relating to children’s color naming and categorization. In a replica-
tion of Franklin and colleagues (Journal of Experimental Child Psy-
chology, 90 (2005) 114–141), Experiment 1 tested English
toddlers’ naming and memory for blue–green and blue–purple col-
ors. It also found advantages for between-category presentations
that could be interpreted as support for universal color categories.
However, a different definition of knowing color terms led to quite
different conclusions in line with the Whorfian view of Roberson
and colleagues (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133
(2004) 554–571). Categorical perception in recognition memory
was now found only for children with a fuller understanding of
the relevant terms. It was concluded that color naming can both
underestimate and overestimate toddlers’ knowledge of color
terms. Experiment 2 replicated the between-category recognition
superiority found in Himba children by Franklin and colleagues
for the blue–purple range. But Himba children, whose language
does not have separate terms for green and blue, did not show a
cross-category advantage for that set; rather, they behaved like
English children who did not know their color terms.
 2008 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Introduction
The proposal put forward by Berlin and Kay (1969) for universal color categories has not been en-
tirely abandoned by its adherents (Kay & Regier, 2003; Regier, Kay, & Cook, 2005), but the results of
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recent studies of color language and cognition have promoted some compromise between that nativist
view and a relativist (often called Whorfian) view for the origin of color categories (Drivonikou et al.,
2007; Franklin et al., 2008; Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006; Kay & Regier, 2006; Pitchford & Mullen,
2005; Tan et al., 2008). These studies have shown, in different ways and under different conditions
that cognitive organization of color corresponds at least in some part to the color terms of the speak-
er’s language.
The allowance that color language contributes to the establishment of color categories has been
necessary to accommodate those recent studies that showed a tight relationship between color lan-
guage and color cognition across different languages and cultures (Davidoff, Davies, & Roberson,
1999; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2004; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2005; Rob-
erson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000; Roberson, Pak, & Hanley, 2008; Winawer, Witthoft, Frank, Wu, & Boro-
ditsky, 2007). These studies show no evidence that color ‘‘space” is warped only at the boundaries
between a putative set of hardwired and innate color categories as proposed by Kay and McDaniel
(1978) and Rosch (1973). Indeed, a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study by
Tan et al. (2008) suggested that language processing areas in the brain are directly involved even in
the simplest discriminations of easy-to-name colors.
In the studies of Davidoff, Roberson, and colleagues, shades of color that are equally spaced in a
particular perceptual metric (e.g., the Munsell system) were judged as unequally spaced by speakers
of a language that marks a category boundary between the colors. In other words, the enhanced dis-
crimination of colors from different categories over equally separated colors within the same category,
generally termed categorical perception (see Harnad, 1987), has been produced by the color terms of
the speaker’s language. For example, adult speakers of Berinmo and Himba, neither of which marks
the distinction between blue and green, show no evidence of better discrimination and memory at
the blue–green boundary but do show those effects at the boundary between color categories that
they mark linguistically, whereas English does not (Roberson et al., 2000; Roberson et al., 2005). Sim-
ilar behavioral differences have been reported between English speakers and speakers of Russian
(Winawer et al., 2007) and Korean (Roberson et al., 2008), both of which have more color terms than
English.
Despite converging evidence for the importance of color terms in establishing categorical percep-
tion for adult populations, there is a considerable body of evidence showing it to be present as early
as 4 months of age (Bornstein, Kessen, & Weiskopf, 1976; Franklin & Davies, 2004; Franklin, Pilling,
& Davies, 2005b; Franklin et al., 2008). Indeed, in Franklin and Davies (2004), categorical perception
was found in 4-month-olds between secondary colors as well as between primary colors, in places
where universalist theories (e.g., Kay & Regier, 2003) would not predict it. There is a contrary finding
to Gerhardstein, Renner, and Rovee-Collier (1999), but Davies and Franklin (2002) contended that
the article’s conclusions are unreliable due to unintended category boundaries. For a strong relativist
position (Davidoff, 2001), the infant data are hard to accommodate. If color category divisions were
established through language, one would not expect any evidence for categorical perception before
the acquisition of color terms. However, the diversity of color terms found in the world’s languages
must mean that any proposed innate category divisions can be overruled by language-induced cat-
egories (Bornstein, 1985; Franklin et al., 2008). The current article does not address the infant data,
but clearly at some point researchers will need to reconcile them with the adult data that show col-
or categorical perception to be language dependent (Gilbert et al., 2006; Roberson et al., 2000; for
recent fMRI evidence of language processing in the discrimination of easy-to-name color stimuli,
see also Tan et al., 2008).
The current article addresses the evidence from toddlers where there is evidence in favor of
both nativist and relativist positions. Children acquire color terms in no particular order (Heider,
1972; Roberson et al., 2004) except for the tardiness of gray and brown (Pitchford & Mullen,
2002; Pitchford & Mullen, 2003; Pitchford & Mullen, 2005). The critical issue here is whether that
acquisition coincides with the onset of categorical perception. In the first developmental cross-
cultural study, Roberson et al. (2004) showed a longitudinal shift in recognition errors consistent
with the development of categorical perception. Franklin, Clifford, Williamson, and Davies (2005a)
reported differently, arguing that there is a particular set of panhuman color categories that are
established not by language but rather by the properties of human color vision. Their argument
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was based on data from samples from both a Western population (United Kingdom) and the
same remote population (the Himba of Namibia) used in Roberson et al. (2004). In Franklin
et al. (2005a), U.K. 2- and 3-year-olds showed better discrimination of colors that crossed the
boundary between blue and green (as well as between blue and purple) than of colors that were
fully within either category (the hallmark of categorical perception) irrespective of their color
naming ability. Furthermore, the Himba 2- to- 5-year-olds, who of course could not be expected
to know English color terms, nevertheless showed evidence of categorical perception at the
boundary between blue and purple. Evidence more in line with Roberson et al. (2004) comes
from Daoutis, Franklin, Riddett, Clifford, and Davies (2006). Using a visual search paradigm in
a study of children from the United Kingdom, Himba, and another similar language group, they
found that search times were quicker for colors embedded within colors of a different category
only for children who gave those categories different names. Therefore, it seemed appropriate
to replicate Franklin et al. (2005a) because their data must create problems of interpretation
for relativist positions.
For the replication of their U.K. toddler study, we followed closely the procedures of Franklin
et al. (2005a) but used only their blue–purple and blue–green ranges and did not include the color
range pink–red because we did not want to introduce the complication of both hue and lightness
differences in determining a color category. In addition, we wanted to be more certain as to whether
or not children comprehended the relevant color terms. Franklin and colleagues, carried out three
analyses. The first was an assessment of categorical perception in their whole sample, the second
was an analysis of categorical perception with respect to correct naming of the stimuli used in
the two-alternative forced-choice task, and the third was an examination of the role of color naming
fluency (combined naming and comprehension of 11 focal examples of basic colors) on the categor-
ical perception of blue–green and blue–purple. The measure of comprehension used was a child’s
ability to correctly select a color from the 11 focal examples when asked (‘‘Show me a red one”).
In Franklin and colleagues’ study, a small negative relationship was found between color fluency
and the extent of categorical perception. The authors offered no explanation of this puzzling finding,
and this is another reason for attempting to replicate their study. Critically, we added a fourth anal-
ysis in which we took into account not only the occasions on which a term was used correctly
(‘‘hits”) but also those on which it was used incorrectly (‘‘false alarms”). The fourth analysis ad-
dresses our concern that the tests in Franklin and colleagues’ study may have underestimated the
color knowledge of children.
For their Himba investigation of categorical perception, Franklin et al. (2005a) chose to investigate
only the blue–purple boundary. The blue–purple range seems to be an unusual choice given that it
may contain a boundary for Himba even though the Himba language does not have a purple category
as such. The majority of adult Himba speakers extend their dark term zoozu to a range of stimuli that
an English speaker would call purple (see Appendix A), and most would apply their blue–green term
burou to the range of blue stimuli used by Franklin and colleagues. So, if the Himba children had at-
tained some understanding of their color terms, it may have contributed toward the finding of cate-
gorical perception. Therefore, in repeating their investigation, we also added an examination of a
range of colors around the blue–green boundary for which adult Himba speakers would use only
the single term burou.
Experiment 1: English children
Method
Participants
A total of 60 native English-speaking children (37 girls and 23 boys) between 31 and 51 months of
age (mean age = 42.24 months, SD = 5.87) were recruited from four different nurseries and a music
group for toddlers in the London area. None of the children was color-blind, according to information
provided by the schools.
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Stimuli
Naming and comprehension. Stimuli were sweater shapes cut out of colored paper that could be placed
over cardboard bear figures. The 22 colors used for naming and comprehension tasks (see Roberson
et al., 2004) were made from Color-Aid paper. These colors included the 11 best examples of the basic
English color terms (red, green, blue, yellow, pink, purple, orange, and brown) used by Franklin et al.
(2005a), hereafter termed ‘‘focal colors” (Berlin & Kay, 1969). An additional set of 11 nonfocal poor
exemplars were added, as in Roberson et al. (2004), and were chosen to be intermediate between
the basic chromatic categories of English (e.g., halfway between pink and orange). The focal colors
were as follows (with Color-Aid codes in parentheses): black (BLACK), white (WHITE), red (RO
Hue), green (G Hue), yellow (Y Hue), blue (B Hue), brown (O S3), pink (R T4), purple (V Hue), orange
(YO Hue), and gray (GRAY 4). The nonfocal colors were as follows: blue (BV HUE), pink–purple (RVR
HUE), yellow (YOY HUE), orange (O HUE), green (GBG HUE), pink–red (ORO T2), green (YGY T1), or-
ange (OYO T4), orange–yellow (YOY T3), purple (RVR T3), and pink (ROR T2). Appendix B gives the des-
ignations and CIE L*u*v* coordinates for each color.
Two-alternative forced-choice discrimination task. For this task, the colored sweaters were made from
glossy Munsell colored paper. There were two sets of test stimuli, blue–green and blue–purple, with
three stimuli per set. The Munsell notations of the stimuli for the blue–green set were 7.5G, 5BG, and
2.5B, all with value (lightness) 5 and chroma (saturation) 10. The stimuli for the blue–purple set were
10B, 7.5PB, and 5P, all with value 3 and chroma 10. Thus, the test stimuli in each set varied only in
Munsell hue, with lightness and saturation kept constant. The test stimuli in each set are referred
to as A1, A2, and B, where A1 and A2 belong to one category and B belongs to a different category,
so as to analyze naming patterns at test (as in Franklin et al., 2005a).
For each of the blue–green and blue–purple sets, there was a within-category pair (A1, A2) and a
between-category pair (A2, B) for which the separations of within- and between-category pairs were
equated in Munsell units of perceptual distance (see Fig. 1). There were three Munsell steps between
stimuli in a pair. Although the human color space on which the Munsell set of colors is based is
non-Euclidian, and completely uniform color differences are impossible to represent in a
Fig. 1. Munsell codes, categorical status, and Munsell distances of the stimuli of the category pairs used in Experiment 1. The
categorical relationships (within or between) of the category pairs are shown for blue–purple (A) and green–blue (B). In Panel A,
chroma = 10 and value = 3. In Panel B, chroma = 10 and value = 5. (Figure taken from Franklin et al., 2005a).
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three-dimensional color model (MacEvoy, 2005), Franklin et al. (2005a) equated color differences in
the more objective CIE L*u*v* perceptual space (see Fig. 2). They concluded that test stimuli and foils
were equally separated in color space, lending further support to the equidistance between colors sug-
gested by Munsell (1905). The location of the category boundaries was taken from the adult data in
Franklin and Davies (2004). The Munsell codes and categorical status of stimulus pairs are shown
in Fig. 1A and B (from Franklin et al., 2005a). Blue–green and blue–purple separations were approxi-
mately 30 units in CIE color space (30 DE).
Procedure
Overall design. All testing was conducted under standardized lighting conditions with the use of a Gre-
tag Macbeth lamp (D65, 6500 K, at 810–1880 lux), as in Franklin et al. (2005a), with children seated at
a comfortable distance from stimuli to point to them. All children completed the training, naming, and
comprehension task using the 22 colored sweaters. For the two-alternative forced-choice task, chil-
dren were tested on both sets of stimuli, in contrast to Franklin and colleagues’ study, where different
children were tested on the two sets. Half of the children received the blue–purple set first, and the
other half received the blue–green set first. For each continuum, eight category pairs were randomly
presented until the four between- and four within-category pairs were exhausted. The two-alternative
forced-choice task was always presented after the naming task and comprehension tasks that were
presented in a randomized order.
Comprehension and naming of colors. For the comprehension task, the 22 focal and nonfocal sweat-
ers were laid out in front of the child, and the child was asked to point to a named color (e.g.,
‘‘Can you show me a red one?”). The color of the chosen sweater was recorded, and the exper-
imenter then asked the child whether there were any other sweaters that corresponded to this
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
-200 -100 0 100 200 300
u*
v
*
7.5G
5BG
2.5B
10B
7.5PB
5P
Fig. 2. Munsell colors of Fig. 1 represented in CIE L*u*v* color space.
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specific color (e.g., ‘‘Are there any other red ones?”). The child’s selection was noted by the
experimenter, who then asked, ‘‘Is there another red one?” The question was repeated, and addi-
tional answers were recorded until the child said that there were no more sweaters of that color.
The same comprehension procedure was carried out for all 11 focal color names in random order.
For naming, each of the 22 sweaters was presented individually and in random order, and the
child was asked to name the color of the sweater. The procedure here differs from that used
by Franklin et al. (2005a), who assessed naming and comprehension using only the 11 focal col-
ors. In their study, children were not asked whether there were other colors that could be given
the same name.
Two-alternative forced-choice task. A training session was carried out before the two-alternative
forced-choice task as in Franklin et al. (2005a). The aim of the training session was to show each
child that when Bear A wore a particular sweater, Bear B also wore an identically colored sweater.
Because the meanings of same and different may be poorly understood by young children (Glucks-
berg, Hay, & Danks, 1976), the term different was not used in the procedure and the training phase
ensured that the child understood the meaning of the word same in the following manner. The two
bears were placed flat on the table in front of the child, who was encouraged to give each bear a
name. The child was told that Bear A has lots of colored sweaters, and the 11 focal sweaters were
randomly laid out above Bear A. The child was then told that Bear B also has lots of colored sweat-
ers, and an identical set of 11 focal sweaters was randomly laid out above Bear B. A sweater from
Bear A’s set was randomly chosen and placed on Bear A. The child was told that if Bear A wears
this sweater, then Bear B also wears this sweater, and so the corresponding sweater was picked
out of Bear B’s set and placed on Bear B. This was repeated three times with different colored
sweaters. Next, another sweater was chosen and placed on Bear A, but this time Bear B’s set of
sweaters was covered with white cardboard. The child was allowed to inspect the sweater, and
after 5 s of stimulus presentation Bear A and its sweater were covered. After a further 5-s delay,
Bear B’s set of sweaters was uncovered and the child was asked to find the same sweater for Bear
B from the set of 11 sweaters. After the child had made a choice, Bear A was uncovered and the
child was encouraged to evaluate his or her response. If the choice was correct, then the child was
praised; if the choice was incorrect, then the child was encouraged to amend his or her choice.
This was repeated until the criterion of three successive correct responses was reached. All of
the children reached criterion.
In the two-alternative forced-choice task, the sweaters were presented under standardized lighting
conditions that simulate natural daylight using the Gretag Macbeth lamp to maintain the uniformity
of the Munsell system (Davies & Franklin, 2002). The procedure and goal of finding the matching
sweater for the other bear was the same as in the training task except that the child was given a choice
of only two sweaters: an incorrect choice (foil) and a correct choice (target) identical to Bear A’s swea-
ter. The categorical relationship (between-category/within-category) of the incorrect and correct
choices was manipulated (for stimulus pairs, see Fig. 1A and B). The procedure was repeated four
times for each within- and between-category stimulus pair (eight trials in all). For two of each set
of four trials, one stimulus was the target and the other stimulus was the foil; for the remaining
two trials, this target/foil allocation was reversed. The order of presentation was randomized for each
child. Alternate children carried out the testing first with the blue–purple set or blue–green set. After
the experimental trials, the child was presented with each of the stimuli individually and was asked to
name the color of the sweater.
Results
Four analyses were carried out on the English children’s data: three analyses identical to Frank-
lin et al. (2005a) and one additional analysis. The first analysis considered, for all children, category
effects for the blue–purple and blue–green sets in the two-alternative forced-choice task. The sec-
ond analysis addressed the effects of naming ability for the two-alternative forced-choice colors on
the category effect in the first analysis. The third analysis addressed color term fluency, assessed
with focal colors, in relation to the categorical effects of the first analysis. The fourth (additional)
analysis was a variation of the first analysis and assessed whether children do or do not know
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color terms from the naming of focal colors and the false alarms made in the comprehension of
the color words.
Analysis 1: Categorical perception for blue–purple and blue–green
For each child, the number of correct identifications in the two-alternative forced-choice task was
calculated when the choice was between two stimuli from the same category (within-category pairs)
and when the choice was between stimuli from different categories (between-category pairs). The
maximum number of correct identifications was four for within-category pairs and four for be-
tween-category pairs. Fig. 3 gives the accuracy scores for within- and between-category pairs for
the blue–purple and blue–green sets. As in Franklin et al. (2005a), between-category accuracy was
higher than within-category accuracy for all conditions.
Accuracy scores were investigated in a 2 (Task Order: blue–purple set first vs. blue–green set
first)  2 (Category: between vs. within)  2 (Set: blue–purple vs. blue–green) mixed-design analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures over the last two variables. The only significant effect
was the main effect of category. Accuracy was greater for between-category pairs than for within-cat-
egory pairs, F(1, 58) = 59.48, p < .001, hq
2 = .306. No other effects approached significance, all Fs < 1,
except for the Category  Set interaction, F(1, 58) = 1.04, p > .30, hq
2 = .018). Accuracy was above
chance (2/4) for both the blue–purple set, t(59) = 9.94, p < .001, and the blue–green set,
t(59) = 13.21, p < .001, and a Bonferroni post hoc test found no significant difference in accuracy be-
tween sets, t(59) < 1. As in Franklin et al. (2005a), categorical perception was demonstrated equally
for both sets.
Analysis 2: Effect of naming accuracy on the size of the category effect
Table 1 gives the naming frequencies for each of the two-alternative forced-choice stimuli for both
sets. Overall, the majority name is between 59 and 85% in agreement with the adult linguistic bound-
ary for the blue–purple and blue–green sets. Of the three stimuli, A2 seems to be most ambiguous for
both sets, probably because it is closer to the linguistic boundary than are A1 and B. These dips are also
found in Franklin et al. (2005a) Table 1, although to a lesser extent.
Individual naming patterns for the colors used in the two-alternative forced-choice task were ana-
lyzed to investigate the effect of linguistic categorization on categorical perception in the manner of
Franklin et al. (2005a). If individuals gave A1 and A2 the same term and gave B a different term, then
they were classified as having a between-category linguistic boundary (boundary group). A ‘‘don’t
know” response was also counted as a term. Therefore, two patterns of naming qualified: (A1: name
1; A2: name 1; B: name 2) and (A1: name 1; A2: name 1; B: ‘‘don’t know”). If individuals gave A2 and B
the same term and gave A1 a different term, then they were classified as having a within-category
0
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Fig. 3. Mean accuracy (±1 SE) for all children for within- and between-category pairs for the blue–purple and blue–green sets.
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linguistic boundary (reverse boundary group). Again, a ‘‘don’t know” response was counted as a term.
Therefore, two patterns of naming qualified: (A1: name 2; A2: name 1; B: name 1) and (A1: ‘‘don’t
know”; A2: name 1; B: name 1). If individuals gave A1, A2, and B the same term, they were classified
as having no linguistic boundary (no boundary group). Again, ‘‘don’t know” was counted as a term.
Therefore, two patterns of naming qualified: (A1: name 1; A2: name 1; B: name 1) and (A1: ‘‘don’t
know”; A2: ‘‘don’t know”; B: ‘‘don’t know”).
Franklin et al. (2005a) combined naming accuracy across the different sets because their sample
sizes were not sufficient to investigate the effect of language for each boundary separately. The current
study, by using a within-participants design, was able to investigate effects of language for each
boundary separately. Thus, participants were grouped into a name boundary, reverse boundary, or
no boundary group for each set separately.
For the blue–purple set, 30 children had a name boundary, 10 had no name boundary, and 20 had a
reverse boundary. For the blue-green set, 38 children had a name boundary, 14 had no name bound-
ary, and 8 had a reverse boundary. In Franklin et al. (2005a), children scoring at floor or ceiling were
not removed from the analysis. Given their prediction of categorical perception for all groups, inclu-
sion of those children would only add noise to their data and, if anything, strengthen any conclusions
if categorical perception were found. However, in the current context that predicts no difference be-
tween within- and between-category conditions, inclusion of those children might promote a false
null result. So, in all subsequent analyses, data are presented only after exclusion of children perform-
ing at chance or at ceiling.
Table 1
Frequencies (percentages) of the color terms offered for the stimuli of each set
Set Stimulus type: Munsell code Color term Percentage of children offering the term
Blue–purple A1: 10B 3/10 Blue 83.6
Purple 6.8
Green 4.9
Red 4.9
A2: 7.5PB 3/10 Blue 59
Purple 31.2
Green 6.6
Red 1.6
Don’t know 1.6
B: 5P3/10 Purple 83.6
Blue 6.6
Red 3.3
Yellow 3.3
Green 1.6
Pink 1.6
Blue–green A1: 7.5G 5/10 Green 85.3
Blue 3.3
Red 3.3
Yellow 3.3
Purple 1.6
Pink 1.6
Orange 1.6
A2: 5BG 5/10 Green 65.6
Blue 21.3
Red 6.6
Don’t know 3.3
Purple 1.6
Yellow 1.6
B: 2.5B 5/10 Blue 85.2
Green 6.6
Pink 3.3
Red 3.3
Yellow 1.6
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After exclusion of children at floor or ceiling for the blue–purple set, 16 children had a name
boundary, 14 had a reverse boundary, and 3 had no name boundary. Therefore, analysis was under-
taken comparing those children who had the correct name boundary with those who did not. Accu-
racy was analyzed in a 2 (Name Boundary: name boundary vs. incorrect boundary)  2 (Category:
within vs. between) mixed-design ANOVA. As in Franklin et al. (2005a), the only significant effect
was the main effect of category, F(1, 31) = 5.93, p = .022, hq
2 = .158, with better performance on be-
tween-category trials overall (see Fig. 4). The main effect of name boundary was not significant, F(1,
31) < 1. The Category  Name Boundary interaction was also not significant, F(1, 31) After exclusion
of children at floor or ceiling for the blue–green set, 25 children had a name boundary, 7 had a re-
verse boundary, and 10 did not have a name boundary. Accuracy was analyzed in a 3 (Name Bound-
ary: boundary vs. no boundary vs. reverse boundary)  2 (Category: within vs. between) mixed-
design ANOVA with repeated measures over the second factor. There was a significant main effect
of category, F(1, 39) = 10.04, p = .003, hq
2 = .205, with no main effect of name boundary, F(2,
39) = 1.40, p < .30, hq
2 = .067, and a trend for the Category  Name Boundary interaction, F(2,
39) = 2.74, p = .077, hq
2 = .123. Bonferroni adjusted post hoc tests revealed that the difference be-
tween within- and between-category pairs was significant only for the name boundary group,
t(24) = 4.89, p < .001. The reverse boundary group escaped significance, t(6) = 2.12, p = .078, and
the no boundary group showed no significant difference, t(9) < 1. Here, with the no boundary group
(see Fig. 4), we have an indication of a contrast to the findings of Franklin et al. (2005a) of equal
categorical perception for all groups.
Analysis 3: Color term fluency and categorical perception
Franklin et al. (2005a) analyzed color term acquisition (number of focal colors named and com-
prehended) in 2- to 4-year-olds. These children were split into four age groups covering 6 months
each (2–2.5, 2.5–3, 3–3.5, and 3.5–4 years). We were unable to find sufficient children between 2
and 2.5 years who could successfully carry out our tasks, so participants’ age in our study spanned
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Fig. 4. Mean accuracy (±1 SE) of children depending on their individual name boundary status for the blue–purple and blue–
green sets on within- and between-category pairs. For blue–purple, name boundary (n = 16) and incorrect name boundary
(n = 17); for blue–green, name boundary (n = 25) and reverse name boundary (n = 7), No name boundary (n = 10).
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from 2.5 to 4.5 years. In consequence, our four age ranges were a little different. Our groups were
aged 2.5 to 3 years (n = 12), 3 to 3.5 years (n = 23), 3.5 to 4 years (n = 17), and 4 to 4.5 years (n = 8).
Table 2 gives the percentages of correct responses for each focal color as assessed in Franklin and
colleagues’ study.
Children’s naming and comprehension of the 11 focal colors improved fromamean of approximately
6 terms for the youngest age group to a mean of approximately 9.5 terms for the oldest age group (see
Table 2); these are slightly different from the rates reported by Franklin et al. (2005a), who found some-
what better naming and comprehension for children corresponding to our two youngest age ranges. In
the current study, as in Franklin and colleagues’ study, there was no difference between naming and
comprehension rates, t(10) < 1 (mean naming = 72.42%, mean comprehension = 70.38%). Using similar
naming and comprehension tasks, some researchers have found that young children pass naming tests
before they comprehend color terms (e.g., Soja, 1994).
The relationship between color term fluency (focal colors named and comprehended) and the ex-
tent of the category effect was explored here in the same way as in Franklin et al. (2005a). Two indexes
were calculated: a color term fluency index, averaging the mean number of focal colors named and
identified, and a categorical effect index, subtracting the within-category score from the between-cat-
egory score (on the two-alternative forced-choice task) for each child. A score higher than 0 indicates a
categorical effect; that is, between-category accuracy is greater than within-category accuracy. A score
of 0 indicates no categorical effect; that is, within-category accuracy and between-category accuracy
are equal. A score lower than 0 indicates a reversed categorical effect; that is, within-category accu-
racy is greater than between-category accuracy.
For the blue–purple set, the relation between the color term fluency and categorical effect indexes
was not significant, r = –.13, p > .20. For the blue–green set, the relation between color term fluency
and categorical effect indexes also was not significant, r = .12, p > .30. Unlike in Franklin et al.
(2005a), where there was an unexplained small negative correlation, here there appeared to be no ef-
fect of color term fluency on categorical perception.
Analysis 4: Categorical perception with a revised assessment of the understanding of color terms
Pitchford and Mullen (2003) discussed how best to assess a toddler’s comprehension of color terms.
They argued, following Soja (1994), that it is insufficient to simply examine hits and misses when the
child is asked to point to a color. In their analysis, they were able to use a signal detection analysis to
take into account false alarms. Their rigorous procedure required too many trials for our younger chil-
dren, so we assigned children as knowing colors following Soja’s procedure previously used with Eng-
lish toddlers by Pitchford and Mullen (2001) and also by Roberson et al. (2004) with both English and
Himba toddlers. Franklin et al. (2005a) assessed comprehension by asking children to point to a color
Table 2
Percentages of (a) correctly named focal colors in the naming task and (b) correctly identified focals in the comprehension task for
each age group as assessed by the procedures used in Franklin et al. (2005a)
Color 2.5–3 years 3–3.5 years 3.5–4 years 4–4.5 years Total
(n = 12) (n = 23) (n = 17) (n = 8) (N = 60)
a b a b a b a b a b
Black 58.3 66.7 60.9 78.3 88.2 88.2 88.9 88.9 74.08 80.53
White 33.3 75.0 82.6 82.6 88.2 76.4 88.9 77.8 73.25 77.95
Red 75.0 66.7 69.5 73.9 94.1 64.7 88.9 77.8 81.88 70.78
Green 50.0 58.3 78.3 65.2 94.1 76.5 88.9 66.7 77.83 66.68
Yellow 75.0 66.7 82.6 78.3 88.2 94.1 100.0 77.8 86.45 79.23
Blue 58.3 58.3 78.3 78.3 100.0 94.1 100.0 77.8 84.15 77.13
Orange 58.3 66.6 60.9 60.9 88.2 82.3 77.7 55.6 71.25 66.35
Pink 75.0 75.0 73.9 65.2 88.2 88.2 88.9 77.8 81.50 76.55
Purple 58.3 58.3 78.3 73.9 82.3 76.5 88.9 77.8 76.95 71.63
Brown 9.1 41.7 43.4 47.8 64.7 58.8 66.6 55.5 45.95 50.95
Gray 33.3 25.0 26.1 69.6 41.2 64.7 55.6 66.6 39.05 56.48
Total 53.08 59.85 67.58 70.36 83.40 78.59 84.85 72.74 72.42 70.38
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from among only the focal colors (the best examples of each category). Here we added nonfocal colors
to the array to make the subsequent request, ‘‘Are there any more [color] ones?,” a sensible one for the
child. The presence of poor examples as well as focal colors gave a more realistic test of the child’s cat-
egory knowledge.
In the current study, for the blue–purple set, children were defined as knowing those color terms if
they named focal examples of blue and purple and pointed to these colors in the comprehension test
correctly and no more than once when probed to name other colors. A similar definition applied for
the blue–green set. If a child pointed to a nonfocal color that could be given the same name, then
of course this was not regarded as an error. However, if a child pointed at a focal color more than once
when probed for another name (e.g., pointing to the blue tile when asked to find both green and purple
tiles), then the child was considered as not knowing this term. Thus, children who did not know the
color terms were defined as those who did not give the correct names for focal colors of blue and pur-
ple or blue and green or who pointed to these colors on more than one occasion when probed for other
colors.
Table 3 shows the classification of the children, after the exclusion of those at floor or ceiling,
under the criteria used in Franklin et al. (2005a) and also according to the Soja (1994) criteria. It
is clear that our criteria changed the allocation. A very similar pattern would have emerged if all
60 children had been included in Table 3. In Franklin et al. (2005a), children were allocated accord-
ing to their performance on the stimuli used in the two-alternative forced-choice task. The Soja
(1994) procedure allocated children according to their ability to name focal colors and not make
false alarms when asked to point to those colors. For the most part, fewer children were classified
as knowing color terms with Soja’s procedure. For example, with the blue–green set, 25 children
were assigned to the linguistic boundary group using the Franklin et al. (2005a) naming criteria,
but only 17 children were assigned to the linguistic boundary group by the Soja (1994) criteria,
thereby leaving 8 children with an incomplete understanding of blue and green. However, allocation
to groups is of equal concern for the no boundary group, where some children clearly did have some
comprehension of colors. Of the 13 children classified in the no boundary group by their naming in
the two-alternative forced-choice task, 4 actually knew the relevant color terms. Thus, using the So-
ja’s criteria, some children in the current study were reallocated as either having or not having a
linguistic boundary.
In sum, there were 30 children who knew all of the blue, green, and purple terms and 12 children
who did not know any of these terms. In addition, there were 7 children who knew only blue and pur-
ple, 4 children who knew only blue and green, 2 children who knew only green, and 1 child who knew
only purple. In total, 37 children knew blue and purple, and 14 children knew neither of these terms;
also, 34 children knew blue and green, and 13 children knew neither of these terms. It is only these
children who were allocated to the ‘‘know” and ‘‘don’t know” groups; children who knew one term
but not the other of the two terms in a set were excluded.
Table 3
Numbers of children, excluding those at floor or ceiling, who were allocated to linguistic boundary, reverse linguistic boundary,
and no boundary groups according to Franklin et al. (2005a) criteria of correctly naming the colors used in the two-alternative
forced-choice task and their knowledge of color terms as assessed by the criteria of Soja (1994) for either blue–purple or blue–
green
Set Boundary group Allocation by the procedures
in Franklin et al. (2005a)
Children knowing color terms by
the procedures in Soja (1994)
Blue–purple Linguistic boundary 16 14
Reverse linguistic 14 8
No boundary 3 1
Blue–green Linguistic boundary 25 17
Reverse linguistic 7 3
No boundary 10 3
Note. The Soja (1994) criteria consist of correctly naming focal colors and not making false alarms when asked to point to the
colors that match a spoken color name.
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To ensure that any null effects were not exaggerated by the inclusion of floor and ceiling effects, our
comparison of ‘‘know” and ‘‘don’t know” children, as in Analysis 2, excluded those children. For the
blue–purple set, this left 23 children in the ‘‘know” group and 8 in the ‘‘don’t know” group. For the
blue–green set, this also left 23 children in the ‘‘know” group and 8 in the ‘‘don’t know” group.
We found that only when children knew their color terms did they show evidence of categorical
perception. This conclusion was supported by two 2 (Category: between vs. within)  2 (Linguistic
Terminology: know vs. don’t know) ANOVAs with repeated measures over the first factor. Fig. 5 shows
the mean accuracy on the two-alternative forced-choice task for those children who either knew or
did not know both terms in a particular set.
For the blue–purple set, the main effect of category, F(1, 29) = 4.45, p = .041, hq
2 = .128, was signif-
icant, with better performance on between-category trials. However, the significant interaction, F(1,
29) = 4.45, p = .041, hq
2 = .128, indicated that only children who knew their color terms showed a sig-
nificantly better performance on between-category trials, t(22) = 3.89, p = .001; don’t know: t(7) < 1
(see Fig. 5). The main effect of linguistic terminology was not significant, F(1, 29) < 1, showing no dif-
ference in performance across terminology groups.
For the blue–green set, there was also a main effect of category, F(1, 29) = 4.56, p = .042,
hq
2 = .136, with better performance on between-category trials. The significant interaction, F(1,
29) = 7.38, p = .011, hq
2 = .203, again indicated categorical perception for children who knew
the relevant terminology, t(22) = 4.70, p < .001, but not for those who had not acquired those
color terms, t(7) < 1 (see Fig. 5). The main effect of linguistic terminology was not significant,
F(1, 28) < 1. Thus, even when ceiling and chance performances were eliminated from the anal-
yses, the results indicated that when color term knowledge (i.e., naming and comprehension)
were taken into account, categorical perception was found only for children who knew their
color terms.
Discussion
The current study set out to replicate and extend Franklin et al. (2005a). As in that study, an anal-
ysis of accuracy on the two-alternative forced-choice task (Analysis 1), without regard for age, color
term knowledge, or floor and ceiling effects, showed categorical perception effects across both the
blue–purple and blue–green boundaries. A second analysis, based on naming accuracy for the colors
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Fig. 5. Mean accuracy (±1 SE) by color term knowledge (‘‘don’t know” vs. ‘‘know”) for within- and between-category pairs for
blue–purple and blue–green sets, respectively. For both sets, ‘‘don’t know” (n = 8) and ‘‘know” (n = 23).
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used in the two-alternative forced-choice task, gave results that mostly replicated Franklin and col-
leagues’ findings. However, for the blue–green set, we found that children with no name boundary
did not show categorical perception. The third analysis, concerning children’s color term knowledge
by age group, showed that they had acquired between 6 and 9.5 terms across the age span tested,
slightly lower than the levels reported by Franklin and colleagues. Another difference was that, in
Franklin and colleagues’ study, color term knowledge was significantly negatively correlated—
although not a large effect—with the extent of categorical perception. The current study found no rela-
tionship between category fluency and categorical perception. However, it was really only Analysis 4
that gave data with an emphasis different from those found in Franklin and colleagues’ study. In Anal-
ysis 4, where children were divided by whether they could correctly name focal colors and compre-
hend the range for which the color terms were appropriate, categorical perception was restricted to
those who knew both color terms in a set.
Analysis 4 leads to an important conclusion with respect to the role of color naming in categorical
perception. The fact that children do not correctly name the colors used in the two-alternative forced-
choice task does not necessarily imply a complete lack of understanding of color categories. Children
may show incorrect color naming for marginal exemplars of a category but still have some compre-
hension of the category (for how sharpening of a color category can occur by exclusion of colors from
distant categories prior to exclusion of colors from adjacent categories, see also Pitchford & Mullen,
2003). Therefore, it is possible that, in Franklin et al. (2005a), the inclusion of children in the no bound-
ary group (Analysis 2) may have contributed to the color categorical perception for that group. Con-
versely, children may correctly name marginal examples but still not see colors from the same
category as more similar than colors from different categories. Thus, it is not simply the online use
of color terms that produces color categorical perception (Fonteneau & Davidoff, 2007; Franklin
et al., 2008).
Experiment 2: Himba toddlers
In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended the cross-lingual aspect of Franklin et al. (2005a)
study with Himba toddlers who were unlikely to have acquired their own color terms (Androulaki,
2003, cited in Franklin et al., 2005a). Franklin and colleagues found categorical perception for Himba
toddlers who, whether or not they had their own color terms, clearly would not have had the English
terms blue and purple used in that study. Their result fits with a nativist account rather than a relativist
account. As discussed earlier, the decision to use blue–purple may have created an ambiguous situa-
tion with regard to Himba color terms. Franklin and colleagues justified not using the more obvious
blue–green continuum because the Himba term burou, covering the range of colors between blue
and green, was a borrowed color term. However, this concern seems misplaced because that term
(burou) would have been used by adults for some of the stimuli in their blue–purple continuum. So,
in addition to replicating their study, we also carried out the test with a continuum between the pri-
mary colors of blue and green.
Method
Participants
Testing took place on two field trips to Namibia. As closely as allowed, the first Himba group of
36 toddlers (21 boys and 15 girls ranging between 2 and 4.5 years of age), tested during the first
field trip, and the second Himba group of 24 toddlers (10 boys and 14 girls also ranging between 2
and 4.5 years of age), tested during the second field trip, were matched in age to the group of 60
English toddlers from Experiment 1. As in Franklin et al. (2005a), the age of the Himba toddlers
needed to be estimated because the Himba do not keep track of their age in the same way as
Westerners do. Contralateral ear touching (Gabriel, 2001), physical height, and any other informa-
tion the parents could give us (e.g., age in relation to sibling) were used to estimate the age of
each child.
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Stimuli, design, and procedure
Stimuli, design, and procedure followed Experiment 1 very closely, although bears were re-
placed by cut-out figures of boys as in Franklin et al. (2005a). Naming and comprehension data
were not collected by Franklin and colleagues because, from an initial check, the children were
found not to know color terms. The same applies to the current data. The same blue–purple set
was chosen to replicate Franklin and colleagues’ findings, but also the blue–green set from Exper-
iment 1 was used in this within-participants design. As in Franklin and colleagues’ study, for the
first Himba group of children, testing was carried out in shaded natural daylight under a tree with
color temperature assessed using a light meter. With the second Himba group, a lightbox was used
to control for any illumination variation that might have affected the appearance of the colored
shirts. The lightbox used Illuminant C (a bluish light simulating natural daylight) under which
the Munsell samples are standardized. A Namibian translator helped with instructions. Each child
was tested individually, free from distraction.
Results
As with the English children, for each child, the number of correct identifications on the two-alter-
native forced-choice task was calculated when the choice was between two stimuli from the same cat-
egory (within-category pairs) and when the choice was between stimuli from different categories
(between-category pairs). The maximum number of correct identifications was four for within-cate-
gory pairs and four for between-category pairs. The Himba children carried out the task for both color
sets balanced for order. In the critical analyses of category, children who were at floor or ceiling on the
task were excluded. To make sure that order effects were unimportant for that analysis, the accuracy
data were first analyzed summing over the two sets in a 2 (Task Order: blue–purple set first vs. blue–
green set first)  2 (Category: between vs. within)  2 (Lighting: natural daylight vs. lightbox) mixed-
design ANOVA with repeated measures over the factor category. No effects were significant, all
ps > .13.
For the blue–purple set, 17 children were at ceiling and 4 were at or below chance, leaving 39 chil-
dren for the analysis of category effects. The data from the 39 children were analyzed in a 2 (Category:
between vs. within)  2 (Lighting: natural daylight vs. lightbox) mixed-design ANOVA with repeated
measures over the first factor. The only significant effect was the main effect of category, F(1,
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Fig. 6. Himba mean accuracy (±1 SE) for within- and between-category trials for blue–purple (natural daylight, n = 19; lightbox,
n = 20) and blue–green (natural daylight, n = 17; lightbox, n = 16) sets.
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37) = 7.71, p < .011, hq
2 = .162, with better performance on between-category trials (see Fig. 6). There
was no main effect of lighting, F(1, 37) < 1, and no significant interaction between lighting and cate-
gory, F(1, 37) = 1.55, p < .30, hq
2 = .04.
For the blue–green set, 27 children at or below chance were removed, and the remaining 33 chil-
dren were submitted to a similar analysis. Neither main effect was significant, F(1, 31) < 1, and the
interaction was also not significant, F(1, 31) = 2.45, p < .20, hq
2 = .073 (see Fig. 6).
Discussion
Our results replicate those of Franklin et al. (2005a) for the blue–purple set, whereas they give
a quite different outcome for the blue–green set. The performance of Himba children in the blue–
green set resembled that of the ‘‘don’t know” group of English toddlers, with no evidence of cat-
egorical perception. Importantly, because a relativist view of color cognition would predict a null
result, the toddlers were well above chance on the task. Therefore, results of the blue–green set
further support the view that acquisition of color terms is required to show categorical
perception.
Both Franklin et al. (2005a) and the current study showed categorical perception for Himba
toddlers using the blue–purple set of colors. We wondered whether testing under natural day-
light conditions in Franklin and colleagues’ study could have produced the category effect for
the blue–purple set, but this seems unlikely given that performance under controlled lighting
was essentially similar to that replicating the conditions in their study. We would rather sug-
gest that category effects for the blue–purple set arise because of some knowledge of the Himba
color terms zoozu and burou (see Appendix A) or because they are better acquainted with cattle
terms than with color terms (Goldstein & Davidoff, 2008). In considering the Himba names for
colors, Roberson et al. (2004), Roberson et al. (2005) found extensive use of terms describing
animal skin patterns (combinations of color, pattern, and texture) for several colors and con-
firmed that the preferred term used by adults for colors in the blue–purple range was not al-
ways a color term. Indeed, for the three colors used in the blue–purple continuum in
Experiment 2, the purple color was named equally often with a cattle term as with the dom-
inant color term. However, the two blue colors were called by the dominant color term approx-
imately four times more frequently. Thus, if cattle terms were known by the children, they
would likely have been used only for the purple color and, hence, set up an artifactual
boundary.
General discussion
A replication of Franklin et al. (2005a) study was carried out with additional analyses that
might help to examine the role of toddlers’ color naming and comprehension in color categor-
ical perception. Despite some small procedural differences in the replication from the original
study (within-group rather than between-group, naming undertaken before rather than after
the two-alternative forced-choice task, and exclusion of the youngest age group), the results
were initially very similar to those of Franklin and colleagues. If anything, one might have
predicted that the procedural changes would encourage categorical perception in our ‘‘don’t
know” group of children. For example, it might have been thought that prior testing of focal
color naming and comprehension before the two-alternative forced-choice task would encour-
age color naming for the stimuli used in the two-alternative forced-choice task and artifactu-
ally produce the between-category superiority in the two-alternative forced-choice task
(Munnich & Landau, 2003), but the data show otherwise. Indeed, despite the remarkable find-
ings in Roberson and Davidoff (2000), now replicated in many laboratories, that perceptual
similarity (categorical perception) changes with verbal load, we know from the procedures
introduced in Franklin et al. (2005b) that overt naming is not the origin of categorical
perception.
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Experiment 1 found an overall effect of category for both color sets for the sample of 60 chil-
dren (Analysis 1). However, with such a large age range, a different performance by a relatively
small number of children who did not know color terms might not be revealed in the group
analysis. Hence, as in Franklin et al. (2005a), children were allocated according to their color
naming ability for the stimuli used in the two-alternative forced-choice task (Analysis 2). Using
their procedure, we showed substantial agreement with Franklin and colleagues’ data for the
blue–purple range, although we did not fully replicate their findings of equivalent categorical per-
ception independent of the accuracy of color naming for the blue–green range. More striking is
the finding that a different assessment of children’s understanding of color terms produced a
quite different outcome. Critical here is how we define the understanding of a color term. The
procedure adopted by Franklin and colleagues of dividing children by their naming the colors
used in the two-alternative forced-choice task may appear to be a reasonable way to assess
the knowledge of a color term. However, we argue that for young children it is more important
to have some estimate of the range of colors that children find acceptable for the color term.
Only then can we be confident that colors from within the same category are perceived as being
more similar to each other than would be assumed from their separation in L*u*v* space. More
rigorously, one might use a signal detection procedure (Pitchford & Mullen, 2002; Pitchford &
Mullen, 2003), but the simpler procedure from Soja (1994) was sufficient to cause a rather dif-
ferent interpretation of the data. In the current study, color term acquisition was reanalyzed
using a method that split children into ‘‘know” and ‘‘don’t know” groups (Analysis 4). Now the
only group that showed category effects was the group of children who knew their color names
according to Soja’s criteria that take into account false alarms as well as accurate naming of focal
colors.
Within our Analysis 2, we replicated Franklin et al. (2005a) intriguing finding that a substantial
number of children would be classified as having a reverse boundary because their name boundary
between green and blue (and also between purple and blue) was not yet aligned to that of adults.
Franklin and colleagues made little comment on this reverse boundary group. Clearly, both their data
and our data found that categorical perception does not simply align with actual naming, but there is
more than one possible interpretation. It might be interpreted to show that color term acquisition is
not necessary for the establishment of categorical perception. However, we suggest that the names
reported by the children do not properly reflect their underlying color knowledge (see also Pitchford
& Mullen, 2003; Roberson et al., 2004). Table 3 shows that nearly half of the children classified as hav-
ing a reverse boundary should actually be classified as knowing the color terms, supporting the second
interpretation.
With respect to Analysis 3, Franklin et al. (2005a) suggested that if color term acquisition were
needed to establish categorical perception, then there could be a positive relation between color term
fluency and categorical perception. This argument presumes that a relativist account would predict a
positive correlation between the extent of categorical perception for any particular color and the num-
ber of other color terms known by children. In fact, they found an unexplained small, but nevertheless
significant, negative correlation. However, there is no reason to assume a relationship between cate-
gorical perception for a particular boundary and the total number of terms known. When children def-
initely know a color term, this implies that they will not confuse that color with other nearby terms
but says nothing about their knowledge of other regions of color space. There is no reason to suppose
that acquiring more secondary terms (e.g., knowing orange and pink) would make a significant differ-
ence for categorical perception to green, blue, or purple, and the current data found no such
correlation.
Considering the Himba data, Experiment 2 replicated the cross-category advantage found by
Franklin et al. (2005a) for the blue–purple range of colors but did not find the same for the addi-
tional blue–green range of colors. Yet the boundary between blue and green is one that is still
regarded as potentially universal (Kay & Regier, 2003), whereas that between blue and purple
is not. The lack of categorical perception for the blue–green range is not due to the Himba chil-
dren’s misunderstanding the task given that their performance was well above chance. We fur-
ther examined whether testing under natural daylight conditions in Franklin et al. (2005a)
could explain the differences between the two sets of results, but this seems unlikely because
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the pattern of results under controlled lighting was essentially similar to that replicating the con-
ditions in their study. Above, we proposed that it is the use of noncolor words for the purple
color this is the most probable origin of a boundary between blue and purple for the Himba
toddlers.
In summary, although our results at first appeared to be very similar to those of Franklin et al.
(2005a), a more detailed analysis does not support their conclusion that there is one particular
set of universal color categories (those named in English) that are independent of language acqui-
sition (Bornstein et al., 1976; Franklin & Davies, 2004). The counterargument here points to the
importance of color term acquisition by children of Himba and English cultures in establishing
both color categories and categorical perception. These findings reflect differences across cultures
in accord with other color categorization studies (Davidoff et al., 1999; Roberson et al., 2004;
Roberson et al., 2005; Roberson et al., 2008; Winawer et al., 2007) and among toddlers of the
same culture separated by language acquisition (O’Hanlon and Roberson, 2006; Roberson et al.,
2004).
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Appendix A
Distribution of English and Himba naming patterns for colors ranging from red–purple on the hor-
izontal axis and from dark (2) to light (9) on the vertical axis.
English color naming distribution
Himba color naming distribution
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Note. In the area that English speakers call purple, Himba speakers extend their dark term (zoozu) up
into a range of much paler colors.
Appendix B
Designations of the 22 Color-Aid sweaters in the CIE L*u*v* metric under Illuminant C as measured
by Roberson et al. (2005)
Tile code Color-Aid Name L* u* v*
1 Gray 4 Gray 71 1 1
4 White White 100 0 0
6 O S3 Brown 44 13 8
23 YO HUE Orange 82 101 62
28 V HUE Purple 40 21 –31
29 BV HUE Blue 36 –2 –23
33 RVR HUE Pink–purple 57 113 1
42 Black Black 35 5 2
45 Y HUE Yellow 90 54 80
46 YOY HUE Yellow 92 83 78
47 O HUE Orange 75 146 44
49 RO HUE Red 59 136 28
50 B HUE Blue 49 –30 –69
53 GBG HUE Green 51 –46 –14
54 G HUE Green 57 –55 4
59 R T4 Pink 89 70 12
77 ORO T2 Pink–red 70 113 28
78 YGY T1 Green 74 –26 60
79 OYO T4 Orange 83 100 49
80 YOY T3 Orange–yellow 87 78 57
81 RVR T3 Purple 63 81 –13
82 ROR T2 Pink 70 108 15
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